North Korean hackers managed to take $6.3bn of cryptoassets out of Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, in November. The actual losses to clients are likely to be minimal as Binance has promised to make everyone whole, but the real cost is to trust in the cryptoasset ecosystem.
Given the drive to bring more and more elements of traditional financial markets onto blockchain, it’s important to be clear-eyed about what the hack tells us about cryptoasset security.
Is blockchain the problem? Not directly. No blockchain protocol was compromised in this or any other hack. The security vulnerability involved a compromised laptop, fake interviews and a panoply of other conventional hacking techniques. In today’s climate of artificial intelligent automation, it appears anachronistic to encounter the old ways still being used at the very top of the game. These techniques were used to gain control of engineers’ computers and launch a cyber-attack.
But just because blockchains were not directly compromised does not mean that cryptoassets are not especially vulnerable. Cryptoassets, because they exist on distributed ledgers, are definitionally outside of the control of centralised exchanges. That means they are especially subject to liquidity heists of the sort Binance suffered.
A TradFi hack?
A direct analogy doesn’t necessarily exist in traditional markets. Hacking the London Stock Exchange would not enable hackers to send assets outside its system. The LSE, as a trading platform, doesn’t itself hold the assets that people trade on it. The assets themselves are held in central securities depositories.
Traditional assets couldn’t suffer a Binance-style hack as they exist primarily as entries on centrally maintained ledgers. It simply doesn’t make sense to send assets outside of that system. The best one could do would be to transfer shares to your own account, but since these are closed, audited systems, each account is traceable to a legally identifiable entity, so any fraudulent transfer would be detected instantly and there would be no means to off-ramp ill-gotten gains.
But as we consider applying tokenisation to more TradFi assets, pursuing the promise of eliminating settlement risk and highly mobile collateral, we have to consider whether we are opening up these markets to novel kinds of threats. As always, the devil resides in the technical detail. Not all blockchain-based assets are equally susceptible to heists.
The weak links
First, we have to acknowledge that it tends to be centralised exchanges and firms that provide infrastructure that are the victims of hacks. Decentralised exchanges and wallet providers typically prove more resilient. These can be more difficult to regulate, however, and therefore might play host to other types of financial crime or market abuse.
Second, while the Binance hackers were able to steal a broad range of cryptoassets on various blockchains, the issuers of some, particularly Circle and Tether, were able to freeze them very quickly. Crystal Intelligence estimates that around $2.65bn of stolen stablecoins was frozen, including $1.76bn of USDT and $823m of USDC. Binance reported a broader total of $2.85bn in digital assets frozen or intercepted.
Much of these frozen assets may eventually be recovered, but since blockchains are immutable, this is a complex legal and technical process. The trade can’t easily be unwound as it would be by a centralised institution like a CSD.
A court case in Wisconsin earlier this year illustrates how long the step from freezing to recovery can take. Circle froze 381,235 USDC in August 2025. A December warrant sought invalidation and equivalent reissue, but Circle said it was not able to comply and that the state court’s did not have jurisdiction. Prosecutors filed a contempt complaint in April 2026, and Circle moved to dismiss on 30 June. Roughly 10 months after the freeze, recovery remained contested.
Burn functions and blacklist mechanisms
Circle’s published EVM contract code contains a blacklist mechanism, but its burn function allows an authorised minter to burn tokens from the minter’s own balance. It does not provide the same direct function as Tether’s published destroyBlackFunds function, which can remove the full balance of a blacklisted address from supply.
Tether’s design has supported burn and reissue in law enforcement cases. A 2024 US Department of Justice filing describes Tether burning frozen USDT and issuing the same number of new tokens to wallets controlled by law enforcement. Tether said in November 2026 that about $1.2bn obtained through fraud and theft had been returned to rightful owners and law enforcement through reissuance.
Knowing that stablecoins are vulnerable to freezing and seizure, the hackers acted as quickly as possible to swap, or pledge the stablecoins as collateral to obtain unfreezeable assets like ETH. For example, the attacker supplied 60m USDT to Aave and borrowed 19,762 wrapped ETH, worth about $44.6m at the time.
Finally, there is a question about the design of the blockchain infrastructure. Private chains are not susceptible to these attacks for the same reason as centralised ledgers: every participant of the network is known and the assets cannot leave the network of known participants. Of course, they may be susceptible to other forms of cyber-attack, but what is stolen is likely to be personal data, rather than assets.
But many in the industry are moving away from private chains because of a lack of liquidity and flexibility.
Protection after attack
Token theft is nothing new in the crypto world. Bearer instruments on immutable ledgers were always going to be vulnerable to this kind of threat. While investors can rely on centralised institutions, they might leave investors additionally vulnerable to attack. These institutions do what they can to mitigate the threat: high-grade security procedures and cold storage of assets but ultimately, the real protection is making their customers whole – if they can afford it.
Or they can rely on decentralised finance, forgoing the protection of centralised institutions in favour of the protection of technology. If this fails, they have no recourse, but they also don’t compromise on central control.
So, if public blockchains are going to be adopted in traditional markets, traditional security standards won’t be sufficient, because they face unique risks. How do we ensure that we aren’t risking liquidity heists when traditional assets come on chain?
The answer is surprisingly simple: regulated securities must only be issued on token standards that ensure they can only be held in wallets that have completed a know-your-customer check with a regulated entity, and that they can be frozen and seized or clawed back when necessary.
These token standards exist already. The Genius Act points in the same direction for payment stablecoins. When its framework takes effect on 18 January 2027, permitted issuers must have the technological capability to comply with lawful orders. FinCEN’s April proposal expressly envisages burning and reissuing tokens to a government-controlled wallet.
Rules like this represent a compromise of the crypto ideal of decentralisation and the elimination of centrally controlled censorship, but the alternative is a world where digital heists of securities become a real possibility.
Lewis McLellan is Head of Content of the Digital Monetary Institute and Clément Guéhenneux is Research Assistant at OMFIF.

Interested in this topic? Subscribe to OMFIF’s newsletter for more.
