The Federal Reserve still sits at the centre of the global financial system. Changes in US interest rates affect exchange rates, capital flows and borrowing costs far beyond America’s borders, which is why every tightening cycle revives the same question for emerging markets: how much damage will the Fed cause this time?
The answer is increasingly less straightforward than it once was. Recent experience suggests that emerging markets are no longer as mechanically vulnerable to US monetary tightening as they were during the crises of the 1990s. What matters is not simply whether US rates rise, but why they rise, what happens to global risk appetite at the same time and how resilient individual emerging economies are when the shock arrives.
Not all Fed tightening is equal
A rise in treasury yields driven by stronger US growth can be relatively benign for emerging markets because stronger US demand supports exports and global activity. A rise driven by inflation concerns or an unexpectedly hawkish Fed is more difficult. In that case, emerging markets face higher financing costs without the offsetting benefit of stronger demand.
This distinction challenges the familiar shorthand that higher US rates are necessarily bad for emerging markets. The same increase in Treasury yields can produce very different outcomes depending on what is driving it, while broader financial conditions, including US high-yield spreads and measures of market risk, can be just as important in determining the degree of stress in emerging markets.
The relative calm during the 2022-23 tightening cycle is a good example. The Fed raised rates at one of the fastest paces in decades, yet most major emerging markets avoided the sudden stops, currency crises and widespread defaults associated with earlier episodes of US tightening. Favourable global financial conditions played a role, but they are only part of the explanation.
Resilience has been earned
Emerging markets have spent decades strengthening the institutions and policy frameworks that determine how external shocks pass through their economies. Many central banks now operate with more credible inflation-targeting regimes and greater independence. Foreign exchange reserves are larger, exchange rates are generally more flexible and reliance on foreign currency borrowing has fallen as domestic debt markets have deepened.
These changes have reduced currency mismatches and weakened the link between exchange-rate depreciation and domestic inflation. Central banks therefore have more space to respond to domestic economic conditions rather than being forced to defend their currencies whenever US rates rise. This does not mean emerging markets can ignore the Fed, however, it changes the policy question from how closely they should follow US monetary policy to how they should respond to the particular shock being transmitted through global markets.
Exchange-rate flexibility remains an important shock absorber, but it may not always be sufficient. Thin forex markets or abrupt portfolio outflows can generate movements that have little to do with domestic fundamentals. In these circumstances, forex intervention, macroprudential policies and, in some cases, capital flow measures can complement conventional interest rate policy. The challenge is knowing when intervention is justified. There is a considerable difference between allowing an economy to adjust to a fundamental shift in global financing conditions and trying to cushion a temporary market dislocation, but distinguishing between the two in real time is rarely straightforward.
There is also a paradox in the relatively weak capital flows towards emerging markets over the past decade. US exceptionalism has attracted capital towards American assets, leaving many emerging economies with less external financing than in previous cycles. This has constrained investment and potentially weighed on long-term growth, but it has also limited some of the vulnerabilities associated with excessive inflows. Current account deficits have generally remained more contained; currencies have been less likely to become severely overvalued and policy-makers have had fewer opportunities to postpone adjustment through easy external financing.
The next test may look different
If US exceptionalism begins to fade, emerging markets could eventually benefit from a broader reallocation of global capital, but the path is unlikely to be smooth. A sharp correction in US markets would initially trigger a flight towards safety, raising volatility and putting pressure on riskier assets before investors began looking elsewhere for returns. The next test may also come from a different source; artificial intelligence is already creating winners and losers across emerging markets. Economies integrated into semiconductor and technology supply chains can benefit from the investment boom, while those whose development strategies rely on exports of cognitive or professional services may face greater disruption.
US fiscal risks are another potential source of instability. A disorderly rise in treasury yields driven by concerns over public debt would look very different from the growth-driven tightening that emerging markets have managed relatively well.
The Fed’s global influence has therefore not disappeared and emerging market resilience should not be taken for granted. Frontier economies remain more exposed, fiscal buffers have weakened in some countries and global risk sentiment can still change abruptly. But the old assumption that a Fed tightening cycle must inevitably produce an emerging-market crisis increasingly belongs to another era.
The more useful question is whether individual countries have built enough domestic resilience to absorb US spillovers without allowing those spillovers to dictate domestic policy.
Yara Aziz is Senior Economist at OMFIF.

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