Europe’s digital sovereignty paradox

Europe wants digital sovereignty, yet its own institutional savings bankroll the same foreign platforms preventing it

Digital sovereignty has become a key strategic objective for Europe, representing the ability of the bloc to develop and supply key digital infrastructure within its borders.

A changing transatlantic relationship and a shifting global order have injected new urgency into European policy. Growing uncertainty surrounding US security guarantees has created in Europe a historic opportunity to reevaluate its critical infrastructure dependencies. Cloud computing exemplifies this asymmetric reliance, with US hyperscalers accounting for almost 70% of the European market and the region’s largest domestic providers struggling to surpass 2% individually.

In practice, achieving digital sovereignty, or strategic autonomy, requires consciously deciding where dependencies can be eliminated and where they can be carefully managed across cloud, artificial intelligence and payment sectors. This will fundamentally redefine how American big tech companies operate across the continent and set new parameters for working with non-European tech firms.

However, policy rhetoric and market reality are pulling in opposing directions. While greater autonomy from US firms is a defined policy objective, it has unfolded alongside a rapid growth in US big tech tapping European debt markets. A paper by the European Central Bank reports issuance in ‘reverse Yankee bonds’ (bonds issued by US firms in foreign currency) almost doubled between 2025 and 2026. This borrowing has been driven in large part by US tech firms’ need to finance enormous capital expenditure.

A paradox for investors

Until recently, much of the tech industry’s capital expenditure could be funded through free cash flow, but the exorbitant costs entailed in datacentre development and AI training has led tech to debt markets, including in Europe. Google, Amazon, Microsoft and Oracle alone accounted for 15% of the increase in domestic euro-denominated corporate bond holdings in the year to March 2026 with strong demand from pension funds and insurers.

While this is a rational move for the institutional investors, the result is paradoxical. European institutional savings end up underwriting the datacentres, compute capacity and AI infrastructure of US giants, further entrenching the foreign tech stack that European policy seeks to counter.

The solution to this is strengthening the capacity of Europe’s capital markets to finance its tech industry. Harmonising rules across the bloc to realise policy-makers’ long-held dream of a Savings and Investment Union is one important but challenging method of achieving this.

However, perhaps an even more important component of the solution lies in addressing Europe’s underpowered venture capital market, a longstanding and frequently discussed structural challenge within Europe, reemphasised in Mario Draghi’s 2024 report on European competitiveness that long predates the present push for digital sovereignty.

There is no shortage of European savings to be invested, but institutional investors face significant constraints in allocating capital to early-stage businesses. Without regulatory changes, mobilising European pension funds to provide venture capital to support the continent’s technological competitiveness will remain difficult.

Political resistance to change

Recently the debate resurfaced in the European Parliament. In late May, German member of parliament Damian Boeselager, the parliament’s rapporteur for the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision II Directive review, formally proposed requiring EU pension funds with more than €1bn in assets to allocate at least 2% of their portfolios to venture capital.

But efforts to mandate greater investment in venture capital have faced political resistance. As with the UK’s Mansion House reforms, officials backed away from mandatory allocation requirements, settling for voluntary industry compacts. The proposal was subsequently dropped from the European Parliament’s draft negotiating position in October, following opposition from pension industry groups and other MEPs.

Recognising that technological sovereignty requires more than regulatory reform, German policy-makers are exploring alternative ways to mobilise capital towards strategic technologies. A joint paper by the Bundesbank, Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security and Hesse’s Ministry for Digitalisation and Innovation outlines 37 measures to strengthen digital sovereignty. Rather than relying on rigid asset mandates, their financing recommendations focus on expanding access to late-stage financing, improving domestic exit opportunities and opening up public procurement for startups.

Europe’s ambitions for digital sovereignty will ultimately depend not only on its ability to develop homegrown technologies, but also on its capacity to finance them. Bridging the gap between Europe’s institutional savings and its innovation ecosystem will require action from policy-makers, technology providers and investors alike. How to make that happen will be a central theme at OMFIF’s European digital sovereignty forum, convened in collaboration with Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt on 3 December.

Katie-Ann Wilson is Managing Director of OMFIF’s Digital Monetary Institute.

Join OMFIF in Frankfurt on 3 December for the European digital sovereignty forum.

Interested in this topic? Subscribe to OMFIF’s newsletter for more.

Join Today

Connect with our membership team

Scroll to Top