Gulf remittances survived the war, but their growth did not

South Asian remittance growth halved as oil bills rose

When the US-Iran conflict began at the end of February, the economies that depend on money from workers in the Gulf feared a double blow. Their oil import bills would rise, and the remittances that help pay those bills might fall as Gulf economies contracted. The first blow landed. The second did not, at least not in the form expected.

Gulf oil output was cut sharply. Crude production shut in by the conflict peaked at 10.9m barrels a day in May, according to the US Energy Information Administration, and was still 2.5m barrels a day in October. Yet the money kept coming. Bangladesh received $3.75bn in March, according to Bangladesh Bank. Egypt received $33.9bn in January to August, 27% more than a year earlier, according to the Central Bank of Egypt. Pakistan ended its fiscal year in June with a record $41.6bn, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates alone sent almost half of June’s inflows, according to the State Bank of Pakistan.

For central banks, the scale is the point. Pakistan’s remittances in its last fiscal year were nearly twice the State Bank’s own reserves, which stood at $21.6bn at the end of October. Bangladesh received $35.6bn in its last fiscal year, more than its reserves of $31.2bn in September on the International Monetary Fund’s standard measure. Sri Lanka’s inflows in just nine months, $6.9bn, almost matched its gross official reserves of $7.1bn. In these economies, remittances are not one line among many in the balance of payments. They are the main source of new reserves.

The arithmetic slowdown

Bangladesh and Sri Lanka publish complete monthly figures, and in both, remittance growth roughly halved once the conflict began. In January and February, Bangladesh’s inflows were 31% higher than a year earlier. From March to August, they were 13% higher. In September, they rose only 3%, and the month’s $2.77bn was the lowest since October 2025. In October, growth recovered to 12%. Sri Lanka’s growth fell from 32% in January and February to 16% from March to August, to between 10% and 12% in July and August, and to 6% in September and 3% in October. Egypt is the exception so far: its growth has held at about 27%, close to the pace of the six months before the conflict.

Some of the slowdown is arithmetic. Both countries had already recorded strong growth in 2025, when Sri Lanka’s remittances rose 19% in the first eight months, so this year is measured against a higher base. But the timing also points to the Gulf. The war disrupted trade and weighed on non-oil activity, and the IMF now expects Saudi Arabia’s economy to contract by 3.3% this year, after growth of 4.6% in 2025. Migrant work in construction, hospitality and services depends on exactly that non-oil activity. Workers in that position keep sending money home, but they cannot keep sending more.

Sri Lanka shows what this means for reserves. In January to September its remittances were about $1.1bn higher than a year earlier. Its fuel import bill rose by around $1.5bn, to $4.5bn, an increase of 51.5%, according to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The current account was in deficit from April to July and again in September, and gross official reserves fell to $6.5bn at the end of June from $7bn at the end of March. They recovered to $7.1bn by the end of October, helped by the central bank’s own purchases of foreign exchange, and fuel spending has now fallen for five months in a row. But the margin that remittances once provided has narrowed.

What central banks should plan for

First, last year’s remittance growth will not return soon. Balance-of-payments and reserve projections for 2027 should assume growth closer to this year’s post-conflict pace than to the rates of 2025. For Sri Lanka, that means planning for growth near the 3% to 6% of September and October, not the 32% of the start of the year.

Second, reserve stress tests should include a fall in Gulf-sourced remittances alongside higher oil prices. The two shocks start in the same place. Gulf labour markets adjust with a lag, through hiring freezes and contracts that are not renewed, so the hit to remittances can arrive after oil prices have eased. Bangladesh’s weak September, followed by a recovery in October, may be an early sign of that lag, or simply a single soft month. Central banks should not wait to find out.

Third, central banks should publish where the money comes from. Pakistan reports remittances by sending country every month. Sri Lanka’s monthly release gives only the total, so neither its policy-makers nor its lenders can see how much of the cushion rests on the Gulf. In a year that tested that cushion, the missing data are a risk in themselves.

Remittances were the one external line that did not break this year. That is reassuring. It is also the best reason to plan for their slowdown now, while there is still room to do so.

Majid Ali Sanghro is an economist and the founder of MASEconomics.

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