The sovereign needs a balance sheet strategy

Higher yields are not only a warning but an opportunity

The return of higher sovereign yields is more than a bond market event. It is a test of fiscal strategy.

Across advanced economies, borrowing costs are rising as investors digest war-driven inflation, heavy debt burdens, central bank balance-sheet withdrawal and structural pressures from demographics, deglobalisation, decarbonisation and artificial intelligence.

The average 10-year yield across the G7 has reached its highest level since 2004, while long-dated yields in the US, the UK and Japan are at multi-year or record levels. The International Monetary Fund expects global public debt to approach 100% of gross domestic product by 2029.

The standard response is familiar: tighter fiscal rules, tax increases, spending restraint and better debt management. All are relevant. But they are incomplete.

Bond markets are asking governments a harder question: how much debt do they have and what productive capacity, assets and future revenues stand behind that debt?

The public assets paradox

Markets increasingly understand this better than many fiscal frameworks. Investors distinguish between governments that borrow to build productive assets and those that accumulate liabilities without strengthening future revenues. Recent empirical work on advanced economies finds that government assets matter alongside liabilities and that public net worth appears to be the central country-specific fiscal factor driving sovereign bond yields.

For decades, governments have managed the liability side of the public balance sheet with increasing sophistication. However, the asset side has received far less attention.

Public land, infrastructure, utilities, state-owned enterprises, public real estate, financial holdings and development rights are often fragmented across ministries, agencies, municipalities and public companies. They are recorded inconsistently, valued poorly and rarely managed as coherent portfolios.

That asymmetry was easier to ignore when money was cheap. In a higher-rate world, it becomes more costly.

The issue is not that assets cancel out debt. They do not. A government cannot pay bondholders with an illiquid railway station, a port concession or an underused land parcel without governance, valuation and market structure. But well-managed assets strengthen sovereign capacity, poorly governed assets weaken it.

The paradox is that markets already look at assets when pricing sovereign risk, while many governments still do not when designing fiscal strategy. Rating agencies and investors should not only ask whether fiscal rules are credible, but whether the state’s asset base is visible, governed and capable of supporting future revenues.

The question is not simply whether markets will force governments to cut spending. It is whether governments can show that their borrowing, assets and long-term obligations form a credible balance-sheet strategy.

Three changes for a credible balance-sheet strategy

First, governments need portfolio visibility. This is different from transparency. Transparency discloses information to stakeholders. Visibility gives decision-makers usable knowledge: what assets are worth, what income they produce, what condition they are in, what alternative uses exist and what opportunity costs are being ignored.

Second, assets should be classified by function. Some are policy assets, whose primary purpose is service delivery and funded by taxes. Others are commercial assets, such as urban real estate, utilities, ports, airports, transit-linked land and public enterprises, which can generate income if professionally managed.

Third, governments need to turn visible assets into investable structures. Public assets do not become capital-market relevant merely because they exist. Investors cannot allocate capital to scattered land parcels, opaque enterprises or infrastructure assets governed by inconsistent mandates. They need portfolios, holding companies, concessions, joint ventures, asset-backed platforms and public wealth funds with clear governance, credible reporting and professional management.

This is where the sovereign balance-sheet agenda becomes a capital-markets agenda. Public-sector assets may be large, but by themselves they do not attract capital. Capital flows to structures in which risk, return, governance and accountability can be assessed.

The quality imperative

Rising yields may tempt governments to sell assets quickly to raise cash. Fire-sale privatisations can destroy public wealth while appearing to improve short-term fiscal metrics. The correct response is not liquidation but balance-sheet management: asset mapping, valuation, portfolio strategy and disciplined decisions about whether to retain, develop, refinance, partner or sell.

Bond issuance also needs to be understood properly. It should not be used as a trick to move debt out of sight. Properly used, debt at the level of a professionally governed asset vehicle can optimise capital structure, lower the cost of capital, impose market scrutiny and create a wider group of stakeholders with an interest in the vehicle’s success.

This leads to a different view of fiscal policy. Borrowing to finance consumption and borrowing to maintain or create long-lived assets can look similar in headline debt metrics. Deferred maintenance can make budgets appear prudent while consuming public wealth. Asset sales can look fiscally responsible even when they reduce public net worth.

Singapore is an extreme example. Its high gross debt does not carry the same market meaning as high debt elsewhere because it is backed by strong public assets, disciplined institutions and investment returns that contribute materially to government revenue. The broader lesson is that markets care about the quality of both sides of the balance sheet.

Higher yields are an opportunity to modernise fiscal strategy. Governments will still need credible tax systems, spending discipline and professional debt management. The sovereign is the largest balance sheet in any economy. Managing it by looking mainly at liabilities is not prudence. It is partial vision.

Bond markets are asking what stands behind the debt. Governments need to have an answer: visible, governed and investable public balance sheets.

Dag Detter is Principal of Detter & Co.

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